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INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY ON EFFECTS OF INCOME TAX
IN PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS
McWeeney v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R.
282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960)
Plaintiff brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for
injuries received while working for the defendant railroad. At the time of
his injuries, he was a bachelor, aged 36, earning approximately $4800 per
year. The jury found him totally disabled and awarded a verdict of $87,000
on which judgment was rendered. The railroad appealed on the ground that
the lower court erred in refusing to give requested instructions to the jury
concerning (1) the immunity of a personal injury damage award from
federal income tax,1 and (2) the deduction of income tax from plaintiff's
gross income in determining his expected future earning capacity. The appel-
late court affirmed, holding the refusal to give the instructions was within
the court's discretion and not error.
Legal writers have presented persuasive arguments in favor of these
instructions in recent years2 and have enjoyed some success in influencing
courts.3 This court, in both its majority and dissenting opinions, reviews
some of the customary arguments on the subject and also adds some new
considerations to the controversy.
IMMUNITY OF PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGE AWARD FROM FEDERAL
INcOME TAX
The court's argument in support of the trial judge's refusal to give the
first instruction4 was, that although it was an accurate statement of law,
it was merely cautionary; therefore a refusal to give it to the jury would
not justify a reversal, unless it could be shown that the verdict was excessive
due to the jury's assumption that the amount awarded would be subject to
taxes. This is the majority view under existing law,5 but considering the
prevailing public awareness of taxes which has developed in contemporary
American society, it is unrealistic to think that juries do not consider them.
Such an instruction appears extremely valuable, and as the dissent in this
case points out, "It would be natural enough for the layman to conclude that
1 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 104(a) (2).
2 See e.g., Morris and Nordstrom, "Personal Injury Recoveries and the Federal
Income Tax Law," 46 A.B.A.J. 275 (1960).
3 See e.g., O'Conner v. United States, 269 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1959); Anderson v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 183 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Meehan v. The Central R.R.
Co., 181 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. N.Y. 1960).
4 This instruction was as follows: "If you arrive at a verdict under the Court's
charge in favor of plaintiff, you will not add any sum of money to the amount of the
verdict on account of federal or state income taxes, since the amount awarded to the
plaintiff is not taxable income to the plaintiff within the meaning of these laws."
282 F.2d at 35.
G See Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393. (1959).
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the plaintiff's receipts from the judgment would be taxed."6 Recent cases
have argued that there is no sound reason for refusing the instruction.7 In
the railroad's appellate brief, it is pointed out that the tax on a verdict of
this size would be approximately $55,000, were it not for the immunity of
personal injury damage awards. A juror with mistaken ideas about taxation
would therefore be expected to make a substantial allowance for this in his
measure of damages. Consequently, it would seem that the only way to
enforce uniform court procedure and protect a defendant against verdicts
improperly inflated to compensate for non-existent taxes, is to make the
instruction mandatory if requested.
DETERMINATION OF FUTURE EARNING CAPACITY-DEDUCTION OF INCOME
TAx FRoM GRoss INCOME
The second requested instruction s raises an issue which in effect has two
aspects: (1) the introduction of evidence bearing on the amount of income
tax plaintiff might be expected to pay on his future earnings, and (2) the
instruction that the computation of an award for loss of future earnings must
be based on plaintiff's expected "net" earnings after taxes.9 In this case, the
trial judge ruled against the requested instruction early in the trial so that
no evidence of plaintiff's tax liability was presented. In upholding the trial
judge, the court presents four objections to the instruction: (1) that future
income taxes are too speculative to be considered, (2) that it would be too
difficult for the jury to make accurate estimates since the interest to be
earned on an annuity would itself be subject to taxes, (3) that future
inflation would offset any present over-compensation, (4) that attorneys'
fees would reduce plaintiff's ultimate compensation in any event.
The contention that future income taxes are too speculative is per-
suasive, but it is unlikely that they are any more speculative or conjectural
than other factors which the jury must consider (e.g., future earnings and
life expectancy). Furthermore, the measure of future income taxes would
be regulated by the so-called "certainty of damage rule." Although this
rule applies primarily to the measure of lost profits in tort and contract
actions, it applies also to future earning capacity to the extent that courts
will require a reasonable degree of "certainty" in regard to evidence ad-
mitted for that purpose.' 0 Most courts will not allow evidence of plaintiff's
6 282 F.2d at 41.
7 Anderson v. United Air Lines, Inc., supra note 3; Dempsey v. Thompson, 363
Mo. 339, 251 S.W.2d 42 (1952).
s This instruction was as follows: "If your verdict is in favor of plaintiff, you must
calculate any past or future loss of earnings on the basis of his net income after deduc-
tion of income taxes." 282 F.2d at 35.
9 These questions may arise in two types of actions-death and personal injury.
Since the problems involved are somewhat different in each case, this discussion will
be confined to loss of future earnings in personal injury cases where there is a total
disability.
10 See McCormick, Damages § 28, at 105 (1935).
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aggressiveness or special ability as tending to show the probability of
future wage increases above the average increase for a worker in his posi-
tion." Similarly, evidence bearing on future income taxes would be con-
fined within reasonable limits of certainty.
The court's next objection is that if net earnings are used as a measure
of plaintiff's loss, it would be necessary to add to the final award an allow-
ance for the taxes on the interest which would be earned on the present
value of plaintiff's future net earnings. 12 To illustrate, plaintiff's annual
salary after taxes in this case was about $4000. His life expectancy at
the time of trial was twenty-nine years; thus his expected future earnings
would total roughly $116,000. In view of the earning power of the dollar,
however, it would take a much smaller sum to earn that amount over a
period of twenty-nine years; at an interest rate of 5%, it would take an
annuity of about half as much or roughly $58,000. That means that
the interest on the present value of the expected future earnings would
total about $58,000, which amount is subject to income tax. In order to
compensate for the tax on this interest, the obvious solution would seem to
be to add the expected taxes to the present value, i.e., if the tax rate were
20%, to add on about $11,600. However, the additional interest on this
amount is also subject to taxes which would necessitate further augmenta-
tion ad infinitem. The court suggests that this computation presents a task
which a jury cannot reasonably be expected to perform. This difficulty
may have been over estimated.
To compensate for future taxes on the interest of the annuity, all
that need be done is to adjust the discount rate by dividing it by the value
of 1 plus the tax rate. If the tax rate were 20%, and the interest rate 5%,
then the adjusted rate would be .05 or .0416. This represents the
1 + .20
discount rate which would precisely compensate for the tax on the interest.
Unfortunately, 4.16%o does not appear in the standard present value tables
now in common usage. This, however, merely throws the burden on the
defense attorney to provide the jury with some method of arriving at a
present value based on a nonstandard rate. This could be done by intro-
ducing more complete present value tables with the discount rate given in
increments of a tenth of one percent and calling an actuary to testify as
to the accuracy of the method of computation.13 The defense attorney
would have the task of preparing the special tables but the necessary cal-
"' Ibid.
12 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 72(b): "Gross income does not include that part of
any amount received as an annuity under an annuity, endowment, or life insurance
contract which bears the same ratio to such amount as the investment in the contract
(as of the annuity starting date) bears to the expected return under the contract (as
of such date)."
13 See Leasure, "How to Prove Reduction to Present Worth," 21 Ohio St. L.J. 204
(1960).
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culations are not difficult. 14 Certainly it would be better to allow the de-
fense attorney to present this evidence, if he is willing to take the time
and effort to do it properly, than to deny him this privilege absolutely.
While the court's first two arguments against the tax instruction
support the proposition that problems of jury control and trial practice
justify resulting over compensation, its final arguments contend that no
actual over compensation results because the hardships of future inflation
and attorneys' fees entitle plaintiff to more than he gets anyway. Thus the
court says, "We won't tell the jury to deduct income taxes from gross
earnings because we want them to add on a little bit extra for inflation and
attorneys' fees which we won't tell them about either." If these items are
valid considerations which the law should take into account in determining
damages for personal injuries, then they should be squarely confronted by
the court and not thrown in as a catch-all when it appears that other
factors might have caused some over compensation. Furthermore, it is
hard to see how future inflation is any more speculative or conjectural than
future income taxes. Therefore, it is inconsistent to give consideration to
inflation on appeal when it was not even suggested in the trial court and
then support a refusal to consider future income taxes because they are
too conjectural.
In personal injury litigation, courts should be duly attentive to the
problems posed by contingent fees, i.e., the large portion of the verdict which
the plaintiff must pay over to his attorney for legal services. However,
any remedial efforts by the courts must take into account the fact that
the problem is by no means unilateral. It is unfair to the defendant, who
has his own attorney's fees to pay, to expect him also to pay the plaintiff's
attorney fees, particularly since this is an obligation contracted by the
plaintiff himself.
CONCLUSION
Although the above arguments taken individually do not seem to
justify a trial court's refusal to give the requested instructions, it must
be admitted that to undertake the additional responsibility of the income
tax problem would add further complexity to the already greatly encum-
14 The formula used to compute the present value of $1.00 given annually for a
certain number of years at a certain discount rate is:
1
1-
Present Value = (1 -i)n
("i" is the discount rate and 'In" the future life expectancy)
Taking this case as an example, if the jury found that income after taxes was $4,000
per year, that the life expectancy was twenty-nine years, that the discount rate was
5% and that the tax rate on the interest was 20%, the present value would be $53,300.
This represents $6,700 less than the figure obtained without using the income tax factor
($65,000). This difference would seem to justify the extra effort needed to insert the
tax factor into the award.
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bered proceedings of a jury trial. Whether the value of greater precision in
damage measurement outweighs this additional burden on the court, how-
ever, should be the controlling issue. Since the greater part of the load
must be borne by the defense attorney himself, it would be better to allow
him to decide, rather than the trial judge, whether or not the possible
savings to be had are worth the additional effort needed to insert this
item into the measure of damages. If more ideal justice is to prevail, then
courts must accept the challenge of the tax problem and in cases such
as this, present the appropriate instructions to the jury when requested.
